



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

been appointed, this can only be done by compelling him to account. Until such accounting be had, and an application be made of the proceeds of the assets held by the receiver, it is difficult to see how a recovery can be had against the directors, because until then the extent of their liability cannot be ascertained."

**CORPORATIONS—SALE OF ASSETS BY ALL STOCKHOLDERS WITHOUT FORMAL ACTION—PURCHASE OF STOCK IN OTHER CORPORATIONS—ULTRA VIRES—DE LA VERGNE REFRIGERATING M. CO. V. GERMAN SAVINGS INST. ET AL., 20 SUP. CT. REP. 20.**—A contract for purchase of stock in another company for the purpose of controlling it, unless expressly authorized, is *ultra vires* and void. *Ultra vires* is a good defense to defeat recovery upon an executed contract, although an action upon *quantum meruit* will lie for benefits received. The good will of a company belongs to the corporation, and a transfer of it by all the stockholders without formal corporate action is invalid and confers no benefit. Justices Brewer and McKenna dissenting.

This reverses two decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth District (36 U. S. A. 184, 49 U. S. A. 777). Although the generally accepted rule seems to be that *ultra vires* cannot be set up by a corporation to avoid its obligation upon a contract performed by the other party (Moraw, § 689 ff.), it is well established in the Supreme Court that such defense is good. The doctrine in this court is that "a contract of a corporation which is *ultra vires* in the proper sense, that is to say, outside the object of its creation, as defined in the law of its organization \* \* \* is wholly void and of no legal effect." "Nothing done under it, nor the action of the court can infuse any vitality into it." But the court will do justice, so far as possible, by permitting recovery on the implied contract to return or make compensation for property or money which it has no right to retain. *Central Transf. Co. v. Pullman*, 139 U. S. 24, 60-61.

**EXEMPLARY DAMAGES—EJECTION OF PASSENGER—IMPLIED MALICE—COWEN ET AL. V. WINTERS, 96 FED. 929.**—A general passenger agent deliberately repudiated certain tickets that had been sold to the public. *Held*, that a bona fide purchaser of one of these tickets could recover exemplary damages for his ejection from defendant's train.

The rule in regard to exemplary damages, as laid down in *Railroad Co. v. Prentice*, 147 U. S. 101-107, is now firmly established and well recognized. The present case is interesting as a recent exposition of that rule. The peculiar duties that a common carrier owes to the public makes an abuse of its civil obligations especially serious. It is this feature, the carrier's close connection with the public, that permits a court to grant the rather exceptional remedy of exemplary damages. The facts in the present case seem to justify the court in holding as it has. But any extension of rule beyond the principles laid down in *Railroad Co. v. Prentice* above, should be viewed with concern, especially in view of the present apparent hostility to large corporations.

**DEAD BODIES—RIGHT OF WIDOW TO REMOVE HUSBAND'S REMAINS—60 N. Y. SUP. 539 (SUPREME COURT).**—A widow freely consenting to the interment of her husband's body in a certain burying ground, is estopped from removing it. But when, at the time of his death, she was in feeble health and became nearly frantic during the time which preceded the burial, she should not be regarded as consenting that the place of burial be permanent.

It has long since been established that the right of burial is a legal right. *Foley v. Phelps*, 1 N. Y. App. Div. 551; *Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery*, 10 R. I. 227; 14 Am. Rep. 667; *Matter of Widening BEEKMAN ST.*, 4 Bradf. (N. Y.) 503;